31 May 2010

Book Review: The Cybernetic Brain

Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst/
Das Rettende auch.

["But where danger is, there grows / also that which saves"]

The poet Hölderlin’s “Wink” (“beckon”, let’s say), famously quoted by the infamous philosopher Martin Heidegger in his musings on technology (or enframing) from 1949 (known as Technology and The Turning [Die Technik und Die Kehre]), might very well have served as the subtitle to Andrew Pickering’s own recent Wink, The Cybernetic Brain (Chicago UP, 2010). The prominence of the Brain in the title indeed is likely to disappoint those expecting brains, or history; Pickering’s compass at any rate is better captured by the (actual) subtitle: Sketches of Another Future. The Cybernetic Brain is Pickering’s road-map to this other, and “non-modern”, future, passionately developed in five chapters, each of which is spun around one of Pickering’s five or six cybernetic heroes – the Britons Grey Walter, Ross Ashby, Gordon Pask, Stafford Beer, Gregory Bateson, and, perhaps the most unlikely among the lot, R.D. Laing.

Anyone picking up a copy will learn a great deal about the lives of these various - more or less obscure - cybernetic missionaries, and their cybernetic “performances” (one of Pickering’s favourite notions here) in particular – all in the service of Pickering’s central purpose, to spell out his vision of the “non-modern”. Long in the making, and eagerly awaited, The Cybernetic Brain draws together Pickering’s various excursions into the cybernetic mangle and (“performative”) ontology that have been leaking out over the course of the last few years, considerably elaborating on some of these themes – the cybernetic, “adaptive”, “performative” and “non-representational” brain holding it all together - and more interestingly, omitting others (notably, the main lines of his earlier, and less celebratory, writings on "Cyborg History" and "Decentring").

Pickering’s book relishes in the bizarre, playful and “performative” dimensions of cybernetic thinking and (especially) doing, and has little time for the somewhat less edifying aspects of cybernetic history (something clearly reflected in his choice of actors); it minutely recounts the workings of any number of whimsical cybernetic machines, the merits of naked-wrestling (under the influence of LSD), of biomorphic (aka analogue, aka performative) computing or of cybernetic music and art; and it doesn’t shy away even from taking sides (as when defending Beer against long-deceased, technocracy-phobic critics, or, as when having little patience with “GOFAI”); and neither does it shy away from giving a fashionable Heideggerian spin to all (albeit with a heavy dose of the Latourian “non-modern” and Foucaultesque technologies of the self). Pickering discerns in these several cybernetics projects the “models” of this another future - different epistemologies, different selves (and self technologies), a different world and order: The cybernetic practices of non-modern complexity and performativity, unjustly marginalized by a hierarchical, orderly, disciplined, unjust and unfun - in brief, “modern” - world, we better had resurrected. Admirably, Pickering’s book has a mission and an agenda; the result, however, to the disciplined ears of this reader at least, all too often veers off into the metaphysical and post-human utopianism; and worse, comes close to sounding indistinguishable from the gospel of the ideologues of the digital age; or indeed, from what others might prefer to denounce as the “new spirit of capitalism”. The Cybernetic Brain certainly is a strange kind of book, half manifesto, half nostalgia for a (countercultural) world lost. In fact, it is easier to say what The Cybernetic Brain is not.

Indeed, although the main cast evidently is all British, and has, to various degrees, profoundly shaped the (public) face of cybernetics in the UK, it clearly is not, for one, a history of cybernetics (or the cybernetic brain) in Britain - something Pickering is emphatically clear about. Readers interested in the history of cybernetics will find little, or nothing, on the lively, and considerable broader cybernetics scene in post-war Britain (let alone, its many distractors). There is, for instance, no room in Pickering’s story (to name only the more obvious suspects) for figures such as J.Z. Young, John Bates, Colin Cherry, Donald MacKay, Arthur Porter, and - the most suspicious absentee - the British ur-cybernetician Kenneth Craik; neither will readers learn much that is new, say, about the “Ratio Club”, the famous British pendant to the Macy conferences, and nothing about the rather more nameless scientists of the man-machine who gathered at the Applied Psychology Unit in Cambridge for example, or under the auspices of the (British) Ergonomics Society; they will learn even less about British history, the history of World War II, or of the cold war, and of cybernetics’ place in it – in brief, little of the historical “context” (however defined) of cybernetics in Britain. Quite to the contrary, Pickering displays a remarkable eagerness not to historicize, or contextualize, the post-war cybernetic moment.

Instead, The Cybernetic Brain invests considerable efforts in demarcating and distancing the brand of hedonistic, artistic, and fun and exciting cybernetics Pickering is “interested” in (or invents), from the equally familiar image - thanks, in part, to contributions by Pickering himself - of a dark and sinister, technocratic science that had sprung from the heart of the military-industrial complex itself, forever contaminated. Pickering insists on this other, and good, cybernetics, and he insists, quite justifiably so, on the “protean” nature of the cybernetic project, and its “multiplicity” as well. Hence, too, the choice of actors, sites and scenes: whether Grey Walter’s robotic turtles, Stafford Beers’ company-simulating ponds, or Laing’s anti-psychiatric refuges, each one of these “ontological theatres” functions to illustrate Pickering’s vision of another future, a future where hierarchies are non-existent, selves and things perform (rather than represent and being represented), science is “nomadic”, and institutions by-passed. The outcome, unfortunately, seems historically simplistic, and is not always particularly compelling – certainly, it comes nowhere near the complex entanglements between and among all manner of social, technological and industrial domains Pickering has explored with much gusto elsewhere (in his work, already mentioned, on cyborg science and the synthetic dye stuffs industry notably). In The Cybernetic Brain, all the mangle happens within a carefully demarcated domain: a cybernetics that is visionary, and “fun”.

That said, The Cybernetic Brain does advance some historical claims that are well worth pondering. Indeed one correlate to Pickering’s resurrection mission is his emphasis on the tremendously marginal status of cybernetics, or what he labels its peculiar “social basis”: odd people ultimately failing to succeed with their wacky projects, hence always “nomadic”, inherently anti-institutional and non-disciplinary (all adding up to “non-modern” and worth emulation). This is an emphasis and picture refreshingly different from the epistemic rupture stories which stylize cybernetics into a world-historic event that signaled the end of matter and energy, and the beginning of the post-modern information age. The plotline of The Cybernetic Brain is a different one: for Pickering, Grey Walter, Ross Ashby and descendants are interesting precisely because their cybernetic projects were all about “ontology” (at any rate, certainly not about ethereal information); and second, precisely because the cybernetic, non-modern vision that each one of them heralded has made so little impact – yet. “Modernity” (rather than post-modernity) is alive and kicking, on Pickering’s mind, and so are its ill effects.

And these effects, as it were, also bring us to the other historical message that’s worth emphasizing here: that of a special affinity between cybernetics and psychiatry which Pickering perceptively argues for. Though Wiener’s own somewhat neurotic constitution, or the many cyberneticians with pertinent interests and occupations – including such central figures as R.W. Gerard, Warren McCulloch, Lawrence Kubie and Frank Fremont-Smith (or on the fringes, someone like Jacques Lacan) - or, for that matter, the role in the genesis of cybernetics of the Macy Josiah Foundation for Mental Health, is hardly news to students of cybernetics, few scholars have made much of this connection. They perhaps should. For, there can indeed be little doubt - in the wake of WWII, both human behaviour and mental health - injured by a very recent, violent past and endangered by a fully-automatized future - had turned into fundamental problems of planetary dimensions. For many (and especially the cybernetically minded), here was a world where life, peace, and truth would be matters of “communication”. For Pickering, psychiatry (or more properly, the subversion thereof) indeed is the thread that not only weaves together the projects of Walter, Ashby, Bateson and Laing (less so, of course, Pask and Beer); it is here that Pickering comes closest to something of an alternative, systematic historical contextualization of cybernetics: psychiatry rather than war-time techno-science, military and engineering. But here too, unfortunately enough, historical breadth and argument isn’t exactly one of The Cybernetic Brain’s strengths. Pickering bases his claims largely on the individual biographies of his main actors, noting that in each case, psychiatric practice somehow shaped and informed their respective cybernetic careers, even if ultimately, their odd researches remained – laudably - marginal to the psychiatric mainstream; he does little, however, to substantiate the case; to give readers a broader sense of the world of post-war (British) psychiatry (and more broadly, of brain science); or indeed, to explain just why there might have been such a special affinity, or why it should have been peculiar to the “fun” type of “British” cybernetics (the strong presence of psychiatrists among the - according to Pickering’s characterization - more un-fun American cybernetic aficionados would seem to make this rather implausible).

It will be for other historians to push and explore further this special affinity, if indeed there was one. As was already said, Pickering’s interests reside elsewhere – Sketches of Another Future - a non-modern, “ontology of becoming”, signs of which he discerns were emergent in the work of the British cyberneticians and their counter-cultural resonances which feature so prominently in his book; and signs of which he discerns were being taken up again, and finally vindicated, in the work of complexity scientists and "third culture" propagandists such as Stuart Kauffman (formerly of the Santa Fe Institute), “New AI” apostle Rodney Brooks, or Stephen Wolfram of Mathematica © -fame. It all might sound more convincing, if it didn’t sound so familiar and ideologically suspect (see, for instance, Fred Turner’s From Counterculture to Cyberculture). And indeed, if not perhaps there might be reasons to be a little less sanguine about the demise of the “modern” (as one might wonder along with Paul Forman and others). Some of Pickering’s recommendations, for instance, that Science and Art are – if only cybernetically mangled enough – fundamentally one and eternally “becoming” and as such “revealing” (as opposed to inherently “enframing”), smell of bad ideology (and one post-pictorial-turn historians of science have enthusiastically cultivated) rather than anything resembling the realities of either science or art. And, of course, it’s no secret just how uncannily close the countercultural imperative of “nomadic” becoming which Pickering aims to “critically recover” has come to resemble the neoliberal appellation. 

Pickering, to be sure, knows all that, and he perhaps would insist that there is room for “another future”, and that any such reservations are just as paranoid and pessimistic as the one leveled against cybernetics by its technophobic critics, obsessed with there being no escape from “enframing”, command and control. Maybe. The Cybernetic Brain, at any rate, does little to resolve these tensions, and it may as well make one wonder just how little the “theatres” of cybernetics may in fact contribute to transform us ("spiritually", "ontologically"), or at least take our thinking into new (non-modern?) directions. Indeed, Pickering, despite spending a great deal on lamenting the marginalization of cybernetics in all that is "modern", equally often insists on the always already cybernetic constitution – the mangle - of science especially (an argument familiar from his earlier work). Cybernetics merely “dramatizes” for us, as Pickering says, the way science works, modern and otherwise - we are back at networks, becoming, and performing. Indeed, sixty years on, I find it difficult to see how cybernetics might help me, or my academic, nomadic friends - equipped with their little yoga mats, i-phones and supplies of SSRIs -, think outside of the box.

21 May 2010

Some think Cajal made the most significant contribution to neuroscience. Do you?

I was invited to give the Reynolds Lecture at the Reynolds Historical Library at the University of Alabama yesterday. While I was there, I happened upon the English translation of Cajal's Degeneration and Regeneration of the Nervous System. I have had arguments with many neuroscientists and neurologists regarding that Age old-question: which neuroscientist mattered the most? The Neuro Times, of course, has no official opinion, but it seems appropriate to record that the consensus among many neurologists and neuroscientists today is that Cajal mattered the most. That observation, perhaps, says more about our reductionist times than it does about Cajal's actual contributions. Yet Degeneration and Regeneration is a fascinating two volume collection. The preface below gives a sense of the volume. Out of curiosity: does anyone know what Cajal's connection to Argentina was? and how it was maintained?

Author’s Preface to the English Edition

This book may be considered, without exaggeration, as unpublished in Europe and North America. Although there appeared, in 1913 and 1914, a Spanish edition which was paid for by the physicians of the Argentine Republic, nearly all the copies were distributed to the South American subscribers. We were getting ready to send the few remaining copies to those European scientists who have specialized in this type of study, when there broke out the dreadful World War which almost completely prevented any scientific interchanges. It is, therefore, not to be wondered at that there are so very few investigators outside Spain who are aware of the existence of this book. The fact that it was written in Spanish, a language rarely known by scientists, is another reason why it is little known.

The present English translation has saved my work from an irremediable loss. To be worthy of the honour of an edition in the land of Waller, the brilliant initiator of these studies, I have attempted to better the text, and to supplement it with some additions which would have been more extensive and detailed had I not feared to add unduly to an already extensive work, which represents to result of eight years of continuous and patient study.

While there exists in any biological investigation a subjective factor which it is difficult to eliminate, a factor which is equivalent to the personal equation of the astronomers, I have tried to reduce it to the minimum. To do this I have used for my illustrations only preparations that were transparent, strongly and selectively stained, and moderately thick sections. These alone areappropriate for following the regenerated nerve fibres, which are hardly ever rectilinear.

In order to keep down the number of figures without infringing upon their usefulness, I have used the well-known method of combined images. Thus all the degenerated or regenerated nerve fibres depicted in some of the figures are faithfully reproduced from the original specimens, the only artifice employed being the fusion into a single plane of structures taken from two or three successive section of the object.

While we grant to the facts which are revealed by highly selective methods an unquestionable objective value, we do not extend this confidence to any hypotheses, our own or those of other investigators, no matter how seductive they may appear. Indeed, unpleasant though it be to acknowledge, one has to admit that in biology theories are fragile and ephemeral constructions that are renewed every eight or ten years. Even during this brief lapse of time they never attain unanimous scientific approval. Owing this relative agnosticism concerning theoretical speculations I present only the theory of neurotrophism and similar ideas, which the reader will find expounded merely as working hypotheses, useful for the synthesis of facts and acceptable merely as scientific tools in Weismann’s sense. I thus recognize fully that the idea of neurotropism through excitatory chemical actions could be replaced by any other conception, such for example, as the electrical hypotheses of Strasser, Kappers, or by those of Harrison, Marinesco, and other investigators. At any rate, while hypotheses pass by, facts remain. These constitute the only pasting patrimony of the investigator and the only positive addition to scientific progress.

I conclude by expressing my profound gratitude to my very learned friend and colleague, Dr Raoul M. May, for undertaking and carrying through the English translation. I am also very grateful to Sir Charles Sherrington, who has interested himself in the publication of this translation, and to the Oxford University Press who have produced with the proverbial care and elegance of English scientific publications.

S. Ramon Y Cajal

Madrid, September 16th, 1927
Santiago Ramone Cajal, Degeneration and Regeneration of the Nervous System, translated and edited by Raoul M. May, 2 volumes (London Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1928), v-vi.

12 May 2010

Book Review: Anne Harrington, The Cure Within: A History of Mind-Body Medicine

Anne Harrington’s past scholarship has focused largely on the cultural history of science and medicine and usually with reference to the brain and nervous system. In The Cure Within: A History of Mind-Body Medicine, Anne Harrington builds on her earlier work by exploring several interlinked themes on mind-body illness and mind-body healing. Unlike her earlier books which were intended for academic audiences, Harrington has written this one for a wider if educated audience. In terms of that audience, the book invariably succeeds. Yet the book lacks a certain texture and quality that made her earlier works such models of historical scholarship and probably those readers who are familiar with her earlier works will walk away feeling a little teased, aware that there was more to be said and that somehow Harrington was holding back. These are obviously not really criticisms. Her book has been positively reviewed in all of the right places, and the importance of her questions and the answers she ultimately offers are poignant.

In short, Harrington addresses the subjective experiences of illness and healing, and the narratives that people use to describe those experiences. Harrington’s interests are to two-fold: she is as interested in why people are as skeptical of these stories as they are willing to articulate and relate to them. To tell her story, Harrington begins by focusing on the healers who sometimes used the power of suggestion to elicit revival in their patients. The important lesson to be drawn from her quick study of demonologists, mesmerists, and hypnotists is that the medical profession has occasionally relied upon similar tricks – in the modern day we call this the placebo effect.

The power of suggestion, however, implied an important duality in suffering. If the doctor could treat with suggestion, then why couldn’t the doctor create illness in the same manner? Enter the hysteric, the neuroasthenic, and the other psychosomatic patients that dominated Jean-Martin Charcot’s Paris clinic or later Freud’s practice in Vienna. Such patients and narratives spoke to a deeper transformation in society. It became conventional in the twentieth century to think that emotional outlook could change subjective bodily reality – the power of positive thinking. Ironically, with this modern understanding of science and emotions came a competing sense of gloom. For while modernity equipped everyone with the tools to survive, modern life also brought with it so many pressures - including the need to think positively – that normal individuals could be forgiven for succumbing to illnesses of modern life like stress. Although Harrington never mentions it, the duality she sets up so forcefully was often played out with greatest effect in the satires of the Age; in, for instance, the short films by the likes of Charlie Chaplin and Stan Laurel and Oliver Hardy. In any case, her story ends with the merger between East and West. Harrington writes that with narratives about Eastward journeys “we seem to be saying that what modernity has wrought, ancient wisdom will heal” (208). Somehow the stress of modern living is supposed to be transformed with Zen.

Harrington’s book is a fun and quick read and her conclusions are thought provoking. Yet there are aspects of her argument that raise many questions, not the least about why historians suddenly discovered the importance of experience and the ways in which experiences changed over time. One cannot help but see larger material forces and pressures undergirding the turn to cultural history and experience. Harrington points out (hopes?) that these narratives of mind and body have a destabilizing effect, one that might bring about an end to the two cultures approach that has so long dominated the academy. But for me that elides a more essential question. What is culture? If Harrington believes that culture exists largely intact and removed from economic stratum of societies (and her book’s presentation suggests that she doesn’t believe that), then the narratives of mind-body medicine might truly be transcendent in the way that her conclusions imply. Yet some might be forgiven for suspecting that these cultural narratives have more to do with middle class anxieties, pressures, and privilege, as well as the shifting global conjunctures of industrial and financial production. My point is that whenever we elevate certain cultural narratives, we do so by ignoring alternative others. Or put differently, we lend our voice to our own cultural narrative, one that is perhaps much more coherent than we realize.

This is admittedly an old-fashioned even unfashionable critique of a currently fashionable historical approach. Harrington’s book is very good. It would be useful in the classroom, and it has already established its broad appeal. But perhaps the book can best serve to push younger historians to ask questions about our own storytelling strategies. Or, put more precisely, why we have adopted the cultural history approach.

08 May 2010

In Search of Politics in Knowledge Production

The forthcoming issue of Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, Germany's premier, and recently overhauled, history of science journal, features a nice little polemic by historian of psychiatry Volker Roelcke. "In Search of Politics in Knowledge Production" perceptively laments the - by and large - absence of “the political dimension” in much recent (cultural) history of science – despite, that is, the progress rhetoric we have grown used to (local and practical turns and so on), and despite the lip-service that is frequently being paid to the formerly “external” as well. More interesting even (to readers of this blog, at any rate), Roelcke makes his case largely by way of finding the political absent in the writings of some prominent historians of brain science and cybernetics (but also, and ultimately more thought-provoking, by way of scrutinizing some seemingly pertinent analytical concepts: “co-production” and the like). This said, Roelcke’s diagnosis at times is surprisingly, and perhaps naively, confident in the optionality of enrolling the “political dimension” (or not); indeed, far less convincing are the damage-control maneuvers Roelcke proposes – they draw on a set of rather well-belaboured tool-kits, associated with the names of Latour and Rheinberger, which might themselves be accused of being implicated in this (we assume) regrettable, apolitical state of affairs. Nevertheless it’s unfortunate that the piece is available in German only; the thrust of Roelcke’s analysis, however, will hardly be news to anyone mildly irritated by the somewhat eloquent playfulness which is characteristic of the profession today, and the political evasiveness which comes along with it – one may find it indicted as well, notably, in Roger Cooter and Claudia Stein’s recent and equally commendable "Cracking Biopower" (being, ostensibly, a review of Rose’s The Politics of Life Itself).



07 May 2010

Featured Neurologist: Anthony Feiling (1885-1975)


Anthony Feiling was born in Surrey, the son of Ernest Feiling, a stockbroker. He received his B.A. from Cambridge's Pembroke College in 1906 before beginning his medical training at St. Bartholomew's hospital. He received his medical qualification in 1909. After serving as captain in the Royal Army Medical Corps during the First World War, he held various appointments at several London hospitals, including a deanship of the medical school at St. George's Hospital (1926-1936) and a physicians position at the Maida Vale Hospital for Nervous Diseases. Although he was primarily a general physician, he was deeply interested in neurology. He was a member of many neurological societies in England as well as in France and America and was the editor of the volume, Modern Trends in Neurology. He was socially regarded as "a character" and had a penchant for travel. Feiling was related to Kenneth Grahame, author of The Wind in the Willows, and he and his brother, Sir Keith Grahame Feiling, the Oxford historian, both inspired characters in the novel. In 1919, Feiling married Helga Hawkins. They had one son.

This article is part of an on-going series of biographies published in this blog.