If it is a tax, then why is it not covered by the Anti-Injunction Act?

As a medical historian, I hold rather strongly to the view that universal healthcare is a human right. I support but dislike the Affordable Care Act, not because it isn't a step in the right direction (it is), but because it offers little in the way of cost controls even as it increases access.

That said, I was delighted that the Supreme Court of the United States found that the US Congress could pass policies leading to future social welfare programs. And declared such policies constitutional. That was a victory for the legitimacy of welfare state policies.

I am nevertheless baffled by one fact: in reading the Roberts' decision, I found myself wondering if this is a tax then why did the court rule on it at all? Shouldn't they have stated as a matter of procedure that this bill falls under the Anti-Injunction Act and therefore any decision is premature?

Political Science and Neuroscience: A New Blog Comments

I'm amazed to discover that there will be a special issue of Political Psychology entitled "The Political Psychology of Biology, Genetics, and Behavior." It appears that biological determinism has entered the political science mainstream. I was especially impressed by Idea and Politics's aside on this point (post here):-

But our “real science envy” propels political sciences’ search for this real science that will finally show how politics and biology are at par.

A New Blog About Dementia: An Historian's Perspective.

I've long admired Jesse F. Ballenger's work. Self, Senility, and Alzheimer's Disease in Modern America: A History is the best history of dementia among many worthy competitors.

I'm thus delighted to discover that Ballenger has started a blog: To Conquer Confusion: A Historian's Perspective on the Science and Experience of Alzheimer's Disease and Dementia. Ballenger's historical writing combines detailed sophistication and finesse with a wider perspective and generality. I've used chapters from his book in my classes, and I was spellbound when I first read his chapter which later appeared in The Neurological Patient in History.

In his first blog post, Ballenger ponders whether he has become one more of us "monkeys" typing away at our keyboards for non-existent audiences. He writes in a partial answer to himself:

And here is where blogging connects to dementia. As I argued in my book, it is no accident that these sorts of social critiques became commonplace at roughly the same historical moment that Alzheimer’s disease was emerging as a major public issue. A disease whose most prominent feature is the destruction of memory, and most dreaded moment is when victims no longer recognize friends and family members they have known for a lifetime, seems to perfectly embody these concern about the erosion of self. Alzheimer’s disease, it seems, is one of the emblematic disorders of a post-modern culture. And conversely, blogging and social media seemsto embody the fragility and fragmentation of postmodern selfhood that has come to make Alzheimer’s so frightening.

Having said all that, I immediately feel the need to issue caveats (which is perhaps symptomatic of the very problems I am describing.) Though the overproduction of information certainly undermines the ideal of writing to create meaning, it does not make meaning impossible. Moreover, though I think the connection I point to between the symptoms of dementia and the way that hyper-mediation of the social world challenges our ideas of selfhood is real and significant, to assert that they are the same would be absurd and dismissive of the real challenges faced by people with dementia. I make a distinction between the dementia produced by the hypocognitive situation of the person with Alzheimer’s, and the confusion produced by a hypercognitive society. Both are profoundly, perhaps at times even equally, disorienting and disruptive of a coherent sense of self. But there is a difference between having one’s cognitive abilities impaired to the degree that one cannot successfully perform expected social roles, and experiencing confusion – even extreme confusion – because social roles that one successfully performs are contradictory and incoherent.

And as the above demonstrates so aptly: because he always has such a clear and provocative message, the content of Ballenger's blog is bound to amaze and perplex us and will thus create permanent audience for his ideas. To Conquer Confusion is no monkey cage. It joins the ranks of Political Descent,  A Dose of History, and Ether Wave Propaganda.   

Coca Cola on the Brain

In an interview, Katie Bayne, president and general manager of sparkling beverages for Coca-Cola,

debunks neuroculture:

Q: What do you say to those who believe that sugar — particularly in soft drinks — works on the brain like an addictive substance?

A: There is no scientific evidence.

While the entire interview is clearly weaseling, Bayne's comment is striking because it identifies the real issue with much that passes for brain science in the public sphere - its simplistic, involves too much modeling, and is not grounded. And when the rubber hits the road, as for example when people want to make claims about sugar and the brain, everything sacrificed for neuro hype becomes a problem.

Should We Allow Psychologists to Evaluate Teachers?

How can we evaluate educators to ensure teacher effectiveness? So asks Wade George at Psychology Today's Blog (here). George quotes Bree Frick an instructor of education psychology who observes: "I believe it [evaluation of educators] could (and should) be done, but how one creates an appropriate, widely approved measure for the quality of the learning process - as opposed to a strictly summative evaluation - is a challenge."

Such an observation, one might imagine, would make psychologists approach this task with some modesty. But George notes that members of the APA's Division of Education Psychology felt strongly that theirs was a role critical  to advancing "teacher effectiveness across the country". Frick, to her credit, was not naive about the challenge:

Testing for a teacher's ability to foster higher-order thinking skills, such as problem-solving ability and hypothetico-deductive reasoning, is indeed a goal worthy of pursuing.... Unfortunately, as we all know, standardized tests that measure rote memorization and test-taking skills (over evidence of deep learning) are a breeze to use in norm-referenced analyses. Bubble sheet assessments measuring student progress—which in turn are used to determine teacher quality—are far less costly than classroom observations or alternate forms of assessment that focus on teachers themselves.

"The Development of the MMPI": Notes to Rod Buchanan's Excellent Essay in the Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences

This essay by Roderick D. Buchanan offers numerous important insights into the technology of psychometric testing. As I was reading this essay, I took fairly extensive notes from the work. These may well interest regular readers. Where appropriate, I provide a bit of context. My comments below are in bold italics.

Do teachers need to learn neuroscience?

Daniel Willingham rants in the Washington Post against Sarah D. Sparks' essay in Education Week:

Teachers don't need to learn neuroscience — or better put, teachers shouldn't need to learn neuroscience — to be protected from charlatans. Teachers need to learn things that will directly help their practice. Charlatan protection ought to come from institutions: from schools of education, from district central offices, and (potentially) from institutions of teachers' own creation.

"Constructing the Self": Notes to Kurt Danziger's Classic Book

Kurt Danziger's Constructing the Self is a terrific discussion of discipline formation as it pertains to psychology in the nineteenth and twentieth century. As I was reading it, I took fairly extensive notes from the work. These may well interest regular readers. Where appropriate, I provide a bit of context. My comments below are in bold italics.